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ABSTRACT 
 
     For civilian general aviation, the Ground-based Regional 
Augmentation System (GRAS) is a cost-effective system 
(compared to Space-Based Augmentation Systems) which is able 
to provide a high degree of GPS accuracy and integrity to meet 
aviation requirements for all modes of flight down to Approach 
with Vertical Guidance (APV).  However, since GRAS corrections 
are transmitted to aircraft from ground-based VHF broadcast 
stations, the GRAS signal-in-space may not always be received.   
The signal may be masked by surrounding terrain when an aircraft 
is on approach, or there may be gaps in the network coverage.  
During a GRAS outage an alternative integrity monitoring system 
is required to allow continuous navigation.  Another requirement is 
that a backup integrity monitoring system must be as low cost as 
possible.  Building upon work presented in Greer et al. (2006), a 
  
 
new method is investigated which involves using a combination of 
GPS, low performance (low-cost) Micro-Electro-Mechanical 
Systems (MEMS) Inertial Navigation Sensors (INS), and an 
aerodynamic model of the aircraft.  This information is combined 
in an Extended Kalman Filter (EKF).  The novel aspect of this 
architecture is the inclusion of an aerodynamic model for the GPS 
integrity monitoring.  During a GRAS outage, the aerodynamic 
model brings a greater level of robustness to the integrity 
monitoring procedure than the low quality inertial sensors can 
provide alone.  This method is also highly autonomous because all 
measurements are local to the aircraft, without requiring external 
aids.  By computer simulation it is shown that the aerodynamic 
model may replace the MEMS INS as a source of dynamic 
information in the EKF.  This allows the benefits of using an EKF 
and filtered fault detection algorithm to be obtained.  It is shown 
that a more stable and lower HPL is achieved under changing 
satellite conditions than a GPS-only RAIM algorithm.  
 
KEYWORDS: GRAS, Integrity, Fault Detection and Exclusion, 
Aerodynamic Model, INS  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The wide range of aviation applications from navigation and surveillance to attitude 
determination makes GPS a very attractive technology from a cost, safety and capability point 
of view.  However, for civilian aviation it is necessary to develop GPS augmentation systems 
to achieve greater accuracy and integrity of GPS, to meet aviation requirements.  The Ground-
based Regional Augmentation System (GRAS) is a cost-effective system proposed by 
Airservices Australia and currently under development by Honeywell.  One limitation of 
GRAS is that since it is a ground-based VHF system, the aircraft may experience short-term 
loss of the GRAS signal, where any gaps exist in the network or the signal is masked by 
terrain.  During a GRAS outage an alternative integrity monitoring system is required to allow 
continuous navigation, especially for the approach phase of flight.   This paper presents a new 
method to aid the GPS integrity monitoring process during these GRAS outages.  Building 
upon work presented in Greer et al. (2006),  the method involves using a combination of low 
cost (and low performance) MEMS INS, an aerodynamic model of the aircraft, and air data 
sensors in an Extended Kalman Filter.  The integrity monitoring scheme considered for this 
system is the Normalised Solution Separation Method, by Young and McGraw (2003).  The 
novel aspect of this research is the inclusion of the aerodynamic model to aid the GPS 
integrity monitoring.  During a GRAS outage, the aerodynamic model can bring a greater 
level of robustness to the system than the MEMS INS can provide alone.  This method is 
highly autonomous because the measurements are local to the aircraft and it avoids the use of 
external navigation aids.   
    
A robust solution to GRAS outages is to have Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) capability 
local to the aircraft.  FDE increases the robustness of the navigation integrity because GRAS, 
like any augmentation system not local to the aircraft, may be vulnerable to unmodelled 
effects, jamming and similar.  In airliners for example, inertial navigators play an important 
role in providing integrity onboard the aircraft.  The quality of these inertial sensors is very 
good and provides long coasting ability even on complete loss of GPS signals. However, the 
  
 
cost of having these expensive sensors for General Aviation cannot be justified, since the 
GRAS system itself is meant to be a cost-effective alternative to SBAS.  
 
In order to retain the advantages of combined GPS and inertial sensors (which are well 
known, see Farrell and Barth (1999)), a solution is to employ lower cost (MEMS) inertial 
sensors. However, these alone may not be enough to reliably guarantee integrity through 
GRAS outages because their performance is much poorer than the devices in airliners.  
Despite the promise of low cost MEMS sensors, they have noisy outputs, are sensitive to 
vibration and temperature gradients encountered in the aviation environment, and often lack 
the robustness, reliability and predictability for such applications.  For these reasons this 
paper considers the addition of an aerodynamic model of the aircraft for GPS integrity 
monitoring.   
 
The aerodynamic model consists of a set of nonlinear mathematical equations which are used 
to estimate the aerodynamic forces and moments acting on the aircraft, and then the 
accelerations and attitude rates of the vehicle (see Stevens and Lewis (1992)). Relevant 
parameters for the specific aircraft and configuration are required as inputs to the model.  The 
parameters of the aircraft which are mass, inertia, lift and drag coefficients, and others, 
provide knowledge about the aerodynamic capabilities of the vehicle.  Further inputs to the 
aerodynamic model are pilot control inputs.  With the estimated accelerations and attitude 
rates of the vehicle, a set of kinematic equations are integrated to derive position, velocity and 
attitude information.  Unlike the INS, the aerodynamic model is relatively immune from the 
effects of vibration and temperature since it is really an addition of software and not a true 
measurement device.  Yet while it does not have measurement “noise” as such, it has 
uncertainty which needs to be taken into account due to unmodelled dynamics, unknown 
wind, and so forth.  Like an INS, the aerodynamic model can provide a high-update rate, 
short-term stable, yet long-term unstable source of information.  When coupled with GPS in  
a Kalman filter, the aerodynamic model can act as a low pass filter much like an INS can, 
filtering the short-term unstable yet long-term stable GPS.  
 
There was a small amount of literature found on using aerodynamic models in navigation.  
The most relevant papers to this subject involve enhancing the coasting ability of inertial 
sensors.  A study was made by Koifman and Bar-Itzhack (1999) where an INS (accelerometer 
bias of 5.0 mg and gyro drift rate of 0.1 deg/h) with an aerodynamic model was found to 
provide better accuracy than an INS alone.  An Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) was used to 
update and calibrate both systems, since each system allowed mutual updating of the other.  It 
was shown that it is possible to improve the accuracy of an INS using an aerodynamic model.   
 
Eck et al. (2000) studied the use of an aerodynamic model with INS and GPS for an 
autonomously flying helicopter, in what they termed “model-based navigation”. The role of 
the model was to improve the coasting ability of the IMU during periods of DGPS outage.  
They concluded that the inclusion of a model within the navigation process can increase the 
robustness and reliability of the navigation data if low-cost inertial sensors are used, or during 
periods of time when GPS signals drop out. 
 
Lievens et al. (2005) considered the use of an aerodynamic model with a single GPS receiver 
for a low cost single-antenna backup attitude determination system, for General Aviation. 
 
The literature shows that an aerodynamic model with an INS can give an improved 
performance over INS alone.  Like an INS, the full state of the aircraft including position, 
  
 
velocity and attitude can be estimated.  The aerodynamic model provides new information 
which can complement the INS.  Essentially, the INS measures the response of the aircraft to 
unknown pilot inputs, while the aerodynamic model predicts the response of the aircraft given 
pilot inputs.  Working together, the INS and aerodynamic model can achieve greater 
robustness since the model provides an extra source of measurements.   
 
The main disadvantage of the aerodynamic model is the uncertainty associated with it. The 
model is only as good as the accuracy of knowledge of the aircraft. There is also the 
uncertainty of the environment in which the aircraft is operating, such as unknown wind and 
turbulence.  Another disadvantage is that General Aviation aircraft are not normally equipped 
with sensors to measure and record pilot inputs.  The costs involved with setting up an aircraft 
to measure pilot inputs may be high.  For this reason, the use of an aerodynamic model 
without control inputs (stick-fixed controls) is considered in this paper.  Control inputs are 
necessary to achieve any length of coasting ability from the model but may not be necessary if 
the model is frequently corrected by the GPS within the EKF. 
 
While the literature shows that studies have already been made on the use of aerodynamic 
models in navigation, it has not been fully explored.  The novel aspect of this paper is the use 
of aerodynamic models in GPS integrity monitoring.  The following section will present an 
architecture involving a GPS, INS and aerodynamic model. Following this, simulation results 
are given where a comparison is made between a low cost INS and aerodynamic model, in 
GPS integrity monitoring.  
 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
When GRAS is available, the integrity of the GPS is assured and it is assumed that no further 
augmentation is required.  During this period the INS and aerodynamic model can be 
calibrated, taking advantage of the high accuracy of GPS/GRAS.  If a GRAS signal is not 
received, the system reverts to the proposed backup system for integrity monitoring which is 
shown in Figure 1.  Note that this architecture is one possible implementation only, and serves 
for the purposes of this study.  In a typical system the GPS might also be aided by barometric 
altimeter.  This has been omitted from this architecture for implementation convenience.   
 
In most aviation literature on GPS-INS integrity monitoring, the GPS and INS is combined in 
a linearised KF in open loop configuration where there is no feedback directly to the INS.  
This is possible since the inertial navigators they consider are high quality.  However with 
low cost MEMS INS, the navigation accuracy degrades in a matter of seconds without aiding. 
For this reason an EKF in feedback configuration is used to combine the GPS and INS, refer 
to Brown and Hwang (1992).  This EKF block is shown in Figure 1.  The algorithm design for 
a filter is given in Figure 2.  This is based on the design found in Greer et al. (2006), but 
incorporates the integrity monitoring algorithm from Young and McGraw (2003) as well as 
the aerodynamic model component.  The GPS, INS and aerodynamic model measurements 
are combined in a tightly coupled configuration.  This includes one EKF (termed the “full 
filter”) which uses GPS measurements from all N satellites in view, and N EKF’s (termed 
“sub filters”) each consisting of GPS measurements from N-1 satellites.   
 
 
Each filter makes two estimates of the state of the vehicle, one using the INS (represented by 
INSk
χ ) the other using the aerodynamic model (represented by 
Mk
χ ).  The INS estimate is from 
  
 
the measured difference between GPS pseudoranges and INS-predicted pseudoranges.  The 
aerodynamic model estimate is from the difference between GPS measurements and 
aerodynamic model-predicted pseudoranges.  Similarly for the pseudorange-rates.  
 
It should be noted that the use of the EKF in this study is for the purpose of evaluating the 
benefits of the aerodynamic model.  In a practical design, the EKF may become unstable due 
to severe nonlinearities, or mismodelling of the process. In this case additional filtering 
techniques would need to be utilized to avoid these problems.  This is left for future work.  
 
The Combine block in Figure 1 indicates either a selection or combination process which may 
be used to select between the aerodynamic model and INS.  The inclusion of the aerodynamic 
model brings a number of possibilities.  The INS may be used to derive the dynamic reference 
trajectory in GPS-INS integration with an EKF, where the aerodynamic model provides an 
extra source of measurements.  Alternatively, the aerodynamic model may be used to derive a 
dynamic reference trajectory of the vehicle, where it replaces the function of the INS.  For 
example, if the uncertainty of the INS is greater than the aerodynamic model, the 
aerodynamic model may be used for GPS fault detection.  The architecture also allows for 
coasting during a minimum number of satellites in view (4 or less) or complete loss of GPS 
signals.  As already shown in the relevant literature, the aerodynamic model can enhance the 
coasting ability of the INS if the GPS is lost.  
  
The estimates and their covariances from the full and sub-filters are then used in fault 
detection and exclusion (FDE).  Following a fault-free or fault-excluded case, the relevant 
corrections are applied to the INS and aerodynamic model as shown by the Corrections block 
in Figure 1.  The corrections include such things as accelerometer and gyroscope biases for 
the INS, and wind and aerodynamic model parameter estimates for the aerodynamic model. 
 
 
Figure 1.  GRAS capable GPS with backup integrity monitoring  
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Referring to Figure 2 above, the total state vector is given by: 
 Tden3210k ]h,,l,v,v,v,q,q,q,q[ Λ=χ  
Consisting of 4 attitude variables (in quaternion representation), 3 velocity (North, East, 
Down coordinate frame), latitude, longitude and height.   
Two a priori state vectors, −
INSk
χ  and −
Mk
χ  are formed by propagating the previous total state 
1k−χ   using the INS and Model equations with the INS measurements (accelerations, rotation 
rates) and control measurements and aircraft parameters for inputs. The a priori INS state 
vector is: 
 
T
INSden3210k ]h,,l,v,v,v,q,q,q,q[INS Λ=χ
−  
The a priori Model State vector is: 
 
T
MODELden3210k ]h,,l,v,v,v,q,q,q,q[M Λ=χ
−  
 
The measurements supplied to the filter are the difference between the a priori state vector- 
derived pseudoranges and pseudorange-rates and GPS pseudorange and pseudorange-rates.  
The EKF estimates the state errors kx  and after correcting the a priori estimates, provides two 
state estimates 
INSk
χ  and 
Mk
χ .  Though it was omitted from Figure 2 for convenience, the 
state covariance estimates P are also propagated with the state estimates.  The solutions and 
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Figure 2.  Algorithm Design 
  
 
their covariances from the full and sub filters are then the inputs to the fault detection stage as 
shown on the figure. 
 
2.1 GPS Fault Detection and Exclusion Stage 
 
For the fault detection and exclusion component the Normalised Solution Separation Method 
by Young and McGraw (2003) was chosen for its ease of implementation and analytical 
nature. 
 
The test statistic is in the position domain.  It is the separation in the horizontal position 
domain between full set kχ  and sub set solutions 
N:1
kχ .  Equivalently, the separation between 
the horizontal errors may be used, as is given here.  For each sub filter: 
 
The test statistic is: 
 nn
T
nn *)B( ββ=λ  (1) 
Where * indicates the Moore- Penrose generalized inverse. 
The solution separation vector between the full filter solution and n
th
 sub filter solution is: 
 )k(x~)k(x~)k( n0n −=β  (2) 
Where )k(x~0  is the 2x1 horizontal position error vector from the full filter and )k(x
~
n is the 
position error vector of the sub filter. 
The separation between the sub filter and full filter covariance estimates is given as: 
 )k(P)k(P)k(B 0nn −=  (3) 
 
The detection threshold is calculated using chi square statistics to meet the required 
probability of false alert, and is not affected by the INS or aerodynamic model measurements.  
N is the number of available GPS measurements. 
 )N/P(fTD FA
2
n ,χ=  (4) 
A fault is declared if nn TD>λ  for any subfilter solution. 
 
Before fault detection is performed by comparing the test statistics with threshold, there must 
be confidence that the fault detection can be done to satisfy the probability of missed 
detection (Pmd).  The Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) is the radius of a circle which 
bounds the true error in the fault-free condition with probability of 1-Pmd, or 0.999 (DO-
229C).  The Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) is the requirement which must be met.  The HAL 
for the Non Precision Approach (NPA) is 556 m.  If the HPL exceeds the HAL, then the 
integrity monitoring function is deemed to be unavailable.  For this reason, it is desirable for 
the HPL to be as low as possible.  Since the HPL is derived from the covariances (see Young 
and McGraw (2003)), a lower covariance contributes to a lower HPL, which may result in an 
increase in fault detection function availability.   
 
If a fault is detected, the next stage is fault exclusion where an attempt is made to exclude it 
from contributing to the GPS solution.  While fault exclusion can be performed using sub-sub 
solutions (N filters with N-2 measurements), the increase in computer processing required is 
not desirable.  To overcome this, a fault exclusion function in the measurement domain can be 
used.  One was presented in Young and McGraw (2003).  For the purposes of this paper of 
comparing an INS with aerodynamic model, fault exclusion is not considered in the following 
results. 
 
  
 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
The architecture described previously was analyzed in computer simulation.  The simulation 
environment is written in MATLAB and incorporates the Aerosim Blockset for Simulink by 
Unmanned Dynamics, LLC.  A ‘truth’ scenario is generated in the simulated airborne 
environment using Aerosim, which consists of a 6-Degrees-of Freedom nonlinear rigid body 
aircraft model, WGS-84 earth and gravity model, changes of dynamic pressure and 
temperature with location and a 3-dimensional wind, turbulence and gust model.  A mean 
wind velocity was arbitrarily specified as 15 knots north, 20 knots east, 10 knots down.   
 
The simulation also consists of in-house developed algorithms.  These include a GPS model 
which incorporates receiver clock bias and drift from Bruggemann et al. (2006),  an antenna 
mask model which accounts for GPS signal masking due to aircraft maneuvers, and extra 
noise terms to model atmospheric, receiver noise, and other errors.  A changing 24-satellite 
optimal GPS constellation from DO-229C was used. The inertial sensor component was 
modeled to represent a low quality MEMS INS with 80 degrees/hour gyros, similar to the 
Analog Devices ADXRS150 angular rate sensor and ADXL202 accelerometer.  For the 
aerodynamic model, a 6-Degree-of-Freedom nonlinear rigid body model representative of a 
single engine light aircraft was developed from Stevens and Lewis (1992).  The results 
presented below are assuming no measured control inputs (stick-fixed controls) to the 
aerodynamic model.  Similar to the approach made in Koifman and Bar-Itzhack (1999), 
random noises with standard deviation of 10% of true values, was added to all aerodynamic 
parameters to represent parameter uncertainty. 
 
The results presented below are to compare a GPS-INS-only solution, and a GPS-
aerodynamic model-only solution.  A result for a GPS-INS-Aerodynamic model solution is 
not presented, but is left for further work.  The filters for the GPS-INS and GPS-aerodynamic 
model used the same values for measurement uncertainty, but the process noise for the 
aerodynamic model was higher than the INS.  This was to accommodate the error in wind 
estimation, lack of control inputs, and aerodynamic parameter uncertainty.  The Kalman filter 
states for the aerodynamic model, were not augmented with any error states to account for the 
wind or aerodynamic parameter uncertainty.  The parameter uncertainty was allowed in the 
system, but the mean wind velocity was roughly estimated based upon simulated GPS and air 
data sensors.   
 
A simulated GNSS approach was “flown” into Brisbane airport, Runway 14 using a joystick 
and Flightgear flight simulator.   An 8.5 minute section of the aircraft’s flight path is shown 
below in Figure 3.  In this simulation the aircraft was navigating with GPS/GRAS until the 
GRAS signal was lost for a 2 minute period as indicated by the red shaded box over the flight 
path of Figure 3.  When the GRAS signal is lost, the system reverts to the backup integrity 
monitoring system discussed in Section 2.  Further, a GPS ramp fault of 8 m/s was put on one 
pseudorange measurement, 10 seconds into the GRAS outage period and lasted for 60 
seconds as indicated by the red lines.  After the GPS ramp fault, a simulated loss of all GPS 
signals occurs for 10 seconds, as indicated by the solid blue region.  This 10 second GPS 
outage was made to consider the coasting ability of an INS and aerodynamic model over a 
short period of time. 
  
 
 
Figure 3. 8.5 minutes of approach 
 
This scenario was repeated for two cases.  The first case used a 0 degree elevation mask 
(results presented in Figure 5), and the second case (results presented in Figure 6) had reduced 
satellite availability due to a 12 degree elevation mask.  The satellite visibility for a 0 degree 
and 12 degree elevation mask is shown in Figure 4 below.   
 
Figure 4. Satellite Visibility for 0 and 12 degree Elevation Mask 
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presented for comparison.  Also for comparison, Green indicates the GPS-only case for a 
“snapshot” RAIM method from Brown (1992). 
 
The growing red (GPS-aerodynamic model case) and blue (GPS-INS case) smooth lines are 
the test statistics for the filter which did not contain the faulty measurement.  This happens to 
be the highest test statistic since the separation between full and sub-filter solutions is the 
largest.  When the test statistic exceeds the dashed black line (the detection threshold), the 
fault is detected.  Because no fault exclusion is considered in this paper the fault is allowed to 
continue to grow.  HPL is represented by the coloured dashed lines.  Note that no test statistic 
for the RAIM method is shown because it is not in the position domain. 
 
It can be observed that the model and INS results are similar in both the test statistic and HPL.  
While it cannot be seen on Figure 5, it was found by inspection of the data that the INS test 
statistic crossed the threshold 1 second sooner than the aerodynamic model’s.  The HPL for 
the aerodynamic model was found to be about 2 metres higher than the INS’s HPL, by 
inspection of the data.  This difference between the aerodynamic model and INS can be 
attributed to the higher uncertainty in the aerodynamic model.   
 
It can also be observed that at no time does any HPL become close to the HAL of 556 metres. 
However when GPS is lost at 82 seconds, the HPL grows rapidly due to the growth in 
uncertainty of the INS and aerodynamic model.  Without GPS aiding, the low cost INS and 
aerodynamic model uncertainty’s grow rapidly.   
 
 
 
Figure 5. Horizontal Test Statistic, 0 deg Elevation Mask 
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Referring to Figure 6, lowering the satellite availability by using a 12 degree elevation mask 
results in a greater difference between the GPS RAIM HPL and filtered fault detection 
scheme’s. The calculated HPL from the RAIM scheme (green dashed line) varies 
considerably due to changing satellites, and is typically higher than the others.  At 25 seconds 
it can be observed that the HPL reaches 390 metres.  If this had exceeded 556 metres (the 
HAL for NPA) the RAIM fault detection function would have been unavailable at that 
moment.   
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Horizontal Test Statistic, 12 deg Elevation Mask 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
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especially true, as shown in this simulation, when the number of available satellites is less 
than 8.   
 
Since satellite signals may drop in and out frequently due to aircraft maneuvers, it is 
beneficial to employ a filtered algorithm for fault detection during GRAS outages, rather than 
using GPS RAIM alone.  Dynamic information may be supplied by a low cost MEMS INS, an 
aerodynamic model or a combination of the two.  The aerodynamic model provides new 
information about the dynamics of the vehicle and does not suffer from the same kinds of 
errors that a MEMS INS does, such as temperature and vibration.   If the uncertainty in the 
INS is greater than the uncertainty in the aerodynamic model, then the HPL from the INS will 
be higher than the aerodynamic model’s.  In this case, the aerodynamic model may be used 
for GPS fault detection since it has the lower uncertainty and lower HPL.  It is also expected 
that if the aerodynamic model is used to provide additional aiding measurements to the INS, 
then the uncertainty will be reduced further, leading to an improvement in HPL and fault 
detection power.  However, this depends on appropriately dealing with the uncertainties in the 
aerodynamic model.   
 
The uncertainty associated with the aerodynamic model directly affects the HPL of the 
integrity monitoring function.  For the simulation presented, the aerodynamic model’s 
uncertainty was higher than the INS due to the lack of control inputs, unknown wind, and 
uncorrected aerodynamic model uncertainty.  This resulted in the HPL for the aerodynamic 
model to be 2 metres higher than the INS, and also resulted in the fault being detected a 
second or two later than the INS.  The literature shows that the uncertainty components may 
be estimated within an EKF by augmenting the state vector with states for the unknown wind 
and parameter uncertainty. This is analogous to including accelerometer and gyroscope bias 
terms to an augmented stated vector for an INS.   
 
It has been shown that the aerodynamic model has promise to provide better GPS integrity 
monitoring performance, with little real cost.  For future low cost avionics architectures, the 
aerodynamic model may serve to provide benefits in a range of applications, such as 
improving INS coasting ability, backup attitude determination systems, and as presented in 
this paper, GPS integrity monitoring.  It may also be possible to perform fault detection of a 
low cost MEMS INS by using an aerodynamic model.  These are the subject of further work. 
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